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Response to sudden epidemic infectious disease emer-
gencies can demand intensive and specialized training, 
as demonstrated in 2014 when Ebola virus disease (EVD) 
rapidly spread throughout West Africa. The medical com-
munity quickly became overwhelmed because of limited 
staff, supplies, and Ebola treatment units (ETUs). Because 
a mechanism to rapidly increase trained healthcare workers 
was needed, the US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention developed and implemented an introductory EVD 
safety training course to prepare US healthcare workers to 
work in West Africa ETUs. The goal was to teach principles 
and practices of safely providing patient care and was deliv-
ered through lectures, small-group breakout sessions, and 
practical exercises. During September 2014–March 2015, 
a total of 570 participants were trained during 16 course 
sessions. This course quickly increased the number of clini-
cians who could provide care in West Africa ETUs, showing 
the feasibility of rapidly developing and implementing train-
ing in response to a public health emergency.
In 2014, epidemic Ebola virus disease (EVD) rapidly spread throughout West Africa; by August of that year, 
≈2,600 EVD cases and 1,400 deaths had been reported (1). 
Widespread EVD transmission occurred in Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia for several reasons. First, these coun-
tries had undergone years of civil war and unrest, which 
damaged an already fragile healthcare infrastructure and re-
duced the healthcare workforce (2–4), gravely limiting the 
countries’ ability to rapidly respond to a growing epidemic 
(5). Second, EVD is a hemorrhagic fever readily transmis-
sible in the absence of rigorous infection prevention and 
control (IPC) (6). Ebola virus is spread by direct contact 
with body fluids of patients or contaminated fomites (7). 
For outbreak control, isolation of patients from the commu-
nity is essential (8). EVD patients can arrive at healthcare 
facilities with severe symptoms such as substantial dehy-
dration from vomiting, diarrhea, or hemorrhage, requiring 
aggressive intravenous resuscitation (9). Third, the EVD 
epidemic placed medical workers themselves at risk. Few 
healthcare workers have cared for patients with such a se-
vere and highly transmissible disease requiring this degree 
of stringent IPC. The close patient interactions that were 
needed put healthcare workers at risk for infection (9,10). 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) serves as a phys-
ical barrier and can protect healthcare workers when used 
properly. However, PPE is only one IPC measure used 
to protect healthcare workers from EVD (11). Moreover, 
availability of PPE alone is not adequate for preventing in-
fection. Without strict adherence to the complex process-
es of donning and doffing PPE and proper conduct while 
wearing PPE, transmission can still occur. Improper don-
ning and doffing of PPE can result in self-contamination 
if unprotected mucous membranes or broken skin are ex-
posed to infected body fluids (12). PPE doffing, in particu-
lar, carries high risk for self-contamination because of its 
complexity combined with healthcare worker fatigue after 
tiring shifts in an ETU (12–14). Fourth, the setting of this 
epidemic was unusual. Unlike previous Ebola outbreaks, 
which occurred predominantly in rural areas, the 2014 
EVD epidemic occurred primarily in densely populated ur-
ban areas. Previous rural outbreaks had been controlled by 
isolating EVD patients from the community through early 
admission to healthcare facilities capable of managing the 
disease. In 2014, the rapid increase in the number of EVD 
patients early in the epidemic quickly overwhelmed the 
number of trained clinicians and healthcare facilities that 
could care for them (5).
By late August 2014, a total of 240 registered health-
care workers had acquired EVD and 120 had died (15). As 
the number of infected healthcare workers rose, medical 
staff became increasingly fearful of contracting EVD from 
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patients. The World Health Organization (WHO) found 
risk of contracting EVD during this epidemic to be 21–32 
times higher among healthcare workers than among non–
healthcare workers (16). Some clinics and hospitals closed 
because of staff shortages or healthcare workers’ unwill-
ingness to work, exacerbating the lack of facilities (17).
Transmission models developed by the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicated that to 
halt the epidemic, ≈70% of EVD patients should be isolat-
ed in appropriate treatment facilities (18). The models pro-
jected that if transmission were not rapidly reduced, EVD 
cases in Liberia and Sierra Leone could reach 550,000 by 
January 2015 (18). A key component of the international 
response to the epidemic entailed deploying trained vol-
unteer healthcare workers to EVD-affected areas to reduce 
community transmission by isolating EVD patients and 
providing care in a safe healthcare setting. To support this 
urgent need, CDC developed and implemented an intro-
ductory EVD safety training course to prepare volunteer 
US healthcare workers to work in West Africa Ebola treat-
ment units (ETUs).
Few deploying clinicians had been trained in the infec-
tion control practices needed to provide EVD care safely in 
limited-resource settings, which are distinctly different from 
US hospitals. In August 2014, the only structured EVD train-
ing for healthcare workers was a 2-day course held in Brus-
sels, Belgium, by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (19). 
MSF acquired extensive EVD care experience in Africa and 
developed this course to share knowledge with staff deploy-
ing to respond to the epidemic (20–22). Given the urgency 
and need for international healthcare volunteers, demand 
quickly exceeded course availability. On August 26–27, 
2014, three CDC members attended the MSF course in Brus-
sels in anticipation of developing a US-based version of the 
training. After rapid course planning and development, CDC 
launched its first EVD Safety Training Course in Anniston, 
Alabama, USA, on September 22, 2014. We summarize the 
development and operation of the course.
Course Concept
The course objective was to introduce deploying healthcare 
workers to principles and practices of safely providing pa-
tient care in a West Africa ETU. Key learning objectives 
included understanding of the following: EVD modes of 
transmission, ETU structure and operation, ETU IPC pro-
cedures (proper PPE donning and doffing techniques, dis-
infection, sharps and waste management), and personal 
safety within ETUs (psychologic preparation, stress man-
agement, overheating while wearing PPE). The various or-
ganizations with which trainees would deploy stocked dif-
ferent types of PPE. Thus, our training strategy centered on 
teaching sound principles and methods to prevent disease 
transmission, rather than focusing on a particular type of 
PPE or protocol. We wanted to prepare volunteers for the 
complex and changing clinical and social environment in 
the center of a transmissible disease epidemic of unprec-
edented scope and severity. The course included classroom 
instruction and practical hands-on training in a realistically 
constructed mock ETU. At the time, West Africa ETUs 
were simple healthcare isolation units that combined a spe-
cific layout with rigorous IPC practices and offered patient 
isolation, diagnosis, and oral and intravenous rehydration 
therapy and medications. Therefore, we focused clinical 
management instruction on these topics. 
The course provided introductory training as the first 
stage of a more comprehensive process, which involved fur-
ther in-country mentoring under direct supervision of local 
or international staff with previous EVD experience. We de-
signed a sustainable, repeatable course model that enabled 
efficient course implementation by sequential cohorts of in-
structors. Beginning in September 2014, the US-based 3-day 
course was offered weekly at the same location.
Staff and Setting
The initial course design team was a multidisciplinary 
15-person unit comprising members who had attended the 
MSF Brussels course, infectious disease physicians, medi-
cal epidemiologists, instructional designers, and healthcare 
workers recently deployed to West Africa who had worked 
in ETUs or EVD-affected communities (returning respond-
ers). Course development incorporated input from experts 
in public health and EVD from CDC, MSF, and WHO and 
from US-based infection control experts. When the pilot 
course was launched, the team had grown to a 40-person 
unit including data managers, communication specialists, 
and logisticians.
The course was held at the US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Center for Domestic Pre-
paredness (CDP) in Anniston (https://cdp.dhs.gov/). CDP 
is an all-hazards training center equipped with classrooms, 
audiovisual equipment, dormitory-style lodging, and food 
and transportation services. The 124-acre campus has build-
ings and outdoor spaces well suited for the construction of 
austere mock West Africa ETUs for simulated exercises. 
CDP trains ≈45,000 emergency responders yearly and ef-
ficiently supported the rapidly expanding course. The loca-
tion, 90 miles from CDC headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, 
USA, enabled relatively convenient transportation of staff, 
supplies, and trainees.
Trainees
We assigned high priority to US healthcare workers sched-
uled to deploy to West Africa. We required that trainees have 
a license to provide clinical care, recent experience provid-
ing direct patient care, and affiliation with a governmental or 
nongovernmental organization responsible for travel to and 
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from West Africa. Healthcare workers included nurses, phy-
sicians, paramedics, physician assistants, and others who 
would work directly with EVD patients in ETUs (Table 1). 
Additional participants included representatives of organi-
zations who were interested in designing similar courses or 
assessing the course’s suitability for their deploying staff.
Operations and Logistics
The 3-day course consisted of lectures, small-group discus-
sions, and practical exercises requiring trainees to perform 
simulated patient care activities in a mock ETU (Figure 
1). Course days lasted ≈9 hours. During September 2014–
March 2015, a total of 16 courses were held. Trainees trav-
eled to Atlanta independently; CDC provided bus transport 
from Atlanta to Anniston, private dormitory rooms, on-site 
transport, and 3 meals per day. The environment promoted 
easy monitoring of trainees and emotional bonding and 
support among course participants.
The most valuable supplies for the course, and the 
most challenging to obtain, were PPE. Other materials 
were supplied by CDP or purchased locally. A list of sup-
plies can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/
safety-training-course/training-toolkit.html.
PPE for trainees consisted of coverall (protective suit), 
eye protection (goggles or full face shield), N95 respira-
tor or surgical mask, 2 pairs of latex gloves, hood covering 
the head and neck, apron, gum boots, and surgical scrubs 
(Figure 2). PPE procurement was challenging for 2 reasons. 
First, protocols dictating which PPE supplies were needed 
had to be established. However, in 2014, consensus on op-
timal PPE for use in West Africa ETUs was lacking (23). 
Consequently, experts from CDC, MSF, and WHO used 
preexisting MSF and WHO PPE guidelines to develop pro-
tocols for the course (24,25). Protocols balanced the an-
ticipated availability of specific PPE in West Africa with 
safe IPC practices. The goal was to impart a fundamental 
understanding of infection control measures necessary to 
avoid self-contamination and assess the safety of PPE that 
trainees might encounter in West Africa ETUs. Within 2 
weeks, we procured a combination of MSF- and WHO-style 
PPE and supplies from local manufacturers, interna-
tional distributors, and medical supply companies. Sec-
ond, worldwide shortages of fluid-resistant coveralls and 
specially made hoods required rapid substitutions to best 
emulate what participants might encounter in West Africa 
ETUs (26). To conserve PPE in short supply, over the 3-day 
course, trainees reused fluid-resistant suits and aprons.
Course Content
As the course development team, we drew course content 
from materials from MSF, WHO, and CDC. We referenced 
technical manuals (27,28), online resources, videos, and 
other materials from the MSF Brussels EVD course, as 
well as input from returning responders and Ebola experts. 
Course materials included lectures, EVD case scenarios, 
step-by-step PPE protocols, and practical exercise instruc-
tion. Course materials underwent CDC institutional clear-
ance, which entailed detailed review of each topic by CDC-
designated experts, and were made available to trainees in 
paper and electronic formats.
Because healthcare workers in West Africa need-
ed to strictly adhere to infection control principles to 
minimize the risk of contracting EVD, we focused most 
course content on IPC. Crucial IPC components for pre-
venting EVD transmission are methodical PPE donning 
and doffing, proper patient flow and triage, injection 
and sharps safety, environmental cleaning and waste 
disposal, safe handling of laboratory samples, and safe 
management of the dead (11). We taught these principles 
through lectures, small-group breakout sessions, and 
practical exercises.
Lectures and Classroom Exercises
Morning sessions were devoted to lectures and small-group 
activities. Lecture topics included EVD epidemiology, 
transmission, and pathophysiology; elementary clinical 
management of patients; IPC; proper ETU design; disinfec-
tion and waste management in ETUs; mental health resil-
ience; occupational health; community health promotion; 
and experimental treatments and vaccines for EVD. Small-
group activities consisted of discussions with recently re-
turned EVD responders and a series of tabletop exercises: 
1) interactive case studies on EVD recognition and triage; 
2) designing safe ETUs, including patient care areas, place-
ment of handwashing stations, and healthcare worker flow; 
and 3) cultural sensitivity exercises, including techniques 
for interacting with community members while recogniz-
ing and respecting local customs.
Exercises in a Mock ETU
Afternoon sessions consisted of practical exercises that 
involved real-life scenarios, which comprised 50% of 
the course. Practical exercises requiring trainees to be in 
 
Table 1. Professions of 570 trainees attending Ebola Virus 
Disease Safety Training Course, Anniston, Alabama, USA, 
2014–2015 
Profession No. (%) 
Healthcare worker 387 (68) 
 Nurse 180 (32) 
 Physician 169 (30) 
 Physician assistant/nurse practitioner 20 (3) 
 Paramedic/emergency medical technician 18 (3) 
Non–clinical care provider 185 (32) 
 Public health official 44 (8) 
 Pharmacist 25 (4) 
 Scientist 21 (4) 
 Mental health professional 17 (3) 
 Other 76 (13) 
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full PPE were a foundation of this course. We focused 
on repetitive practical exercises involving donning PPE 
with a partner, performing simulated high-risk patient-
care activities, and doffing PPE under close supervision. 
Anecdotal observations indicated that trainees entering 
the mock ETU experienced increased concentration and 
anxiety, suggesting a level of realism in the simulated 
training setting.
In West Africa, healthcare workers faced additional 
challenges of harsh conditions, such as high temperatures, 
inconsistent electricity, poor lighting and visibility, and 
overcrowded ETUs (12). Returning responders described 
overworked staff in West Africa, covered in layers of PPE 
in sweltering heat, who experienced excessive sweating, 
dehydration, fogged eye protection, and decreased dexter-
ity while caring for and transporting critically ill and dy-
ing patients. As core body temperatures rise while wearing 
PPE, overheating can lead to motor and cognitive impair-
ment, further increasing healthcare worker vulnerability to 
breaches of safety practices (29). Thus, we constructed 2 
mock ETUs to simulate the challenging conditions train-
ees might face in West Africa. Our mock ETUs had clearly 
designated low- and high-risk zones, stocks of PPE with 
changing areas, simulated chlorine footbaths and hand-
washing stations, weighted patient dummies, a triage area, 
and a unidirectional flow pattern from low- to high-risk 
zones (Figures 1, 3).
Teams of 4–6 trainees entered mock ETUs, where 
they received a focused orientation and then donned PPE 
under direct supervision of a course instructor. According 
to MSF protocol, we taught a buddy system during practi-
cal exercises, whereby partners observed each other during 
PPE donning and regularly checked for breaches in PPE 
or infection control protocol. Trainees then entered the 
patient-care area, where they conducted instructor-guided 
simulated patient-care activities, including collecting and 
preparing blood specimens for transport, transporting a pa-
tient into the ETU, performing environmental decontami-
nation and waste management, and transporting a deceased 
patient from a patient care area to a morgue. After these 
Figure 1. Layout of mock Ebola 
Treatment Unit used during the 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Ebola Safety Training 
Course, held at the US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency 
Center for Domestic Preparedness 
in Anniston, Alabama, USA, 
2014–2015. Green indicates low-
risk zone, which included staff PPE 
donning area, the staff changing 
area (after PPE doffing), pharmacy, 
staff showers and toilets, and a 
staff debriefing area; red indicates 
high-risk zone, which included 
EVD patient triage area, wards 
for patients with suspected and 
confirmed EVD, patient showers 
and toilets, and the morgue. 
Arrows indicate staff unidirectional 
movement from lower to higher risk 
zones. EVD, Ebola virus disease; 
PPE, personal protective equipment.
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 23, Supplement to December 2017 S221
Safety Training for Ebola Healthcare Workers
activities, trainees learned a regimented doffing process in 
a designated area of the mock ETU, performing the struc-
tured PPE removal sequence under direct supervision of 
course instructors and the observing partner.
Course Evaluation
Trainee Demographics
By March 25, 2015, 570 trainees had attended a total of 
16 course sessions. Trainees came from US governmental 
agencies (n = 352, 62%); 43 nongovernmental organiza-
tions, (n = 164, 29%); and other organizations, including 
foreign governments, private healthcare organizations, and 
academic institutions (n = 54, 9%) (Table 2). Trainees trav-
eled from 36 states and 20 countries to attend the course. 
To our knowledge, although most deployed to ETUs in 
West Africa, some for months at a time, none of the train-
ees acquired EVD during deployment.
Costs and Staff Resources
A course of this scale required substantial resources. As 
the course evolved, the number of trainees increased each 
week. To ensure close supervision during practical exer-
cises, we added course graduates to the staff to maintain an 
instructor:trainee ratio of 1:4. Over the life of the course, 
a total of 193 staff (89 CDC, 104 non-CDC) provided the 
training: 26 experts in infectious diseases and 117 practical 
exercise course instructors.
We estimate that 30,000 staff person-hours were re-
quired for course development (12,000 hours), 16 sessions 
of course instruction (10,000 hours), and course material 
revision (8,000 hours). The average total cost for a 3-day 
course was approximately US$27,000, or $750 per trainee 
for meals, lodging, transport, administrative coordination, 
and PPE and other supplies (Table 3). Course development 
and implementation relied on a multidisciplinary team; out-
side experts with ETU experience were essential. Because 
no mechanism existed to rapidly establish a training course 
of this scope, assembling and maintaining this large, di-
verse team was time-consuming and challenging. Institu-
tional support was critical for creating interagency collabo-
rations. Modifying an existing interagency agreement with 
the Oak Ridge Institute for Scientific Education (https://
orise.orau.gov/) was instrumental in finding and supporting 
the travel of many trainers, and a new interagency agree-
ment between CDC and FEMA provided access to the CDP 
campus and infrastructure.
Figure 2. Example of personal protective equipment (PPE) used 
during the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Ebola 
Safety Training Course, held at the US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Center for Domestic Preparedness in 
Anniston, Alabama, USA, 2014–2015. From top to bottom: head 
covering, eye protection, N95 respirator, apron over coverall, 2 
pairs of latex gloves, gum boots.
Figure 3. Constructed mock Ebola Treatment Unit used during the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Ebola Safety Training 
Course, held at the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama, USA, 
2014–2015. Trainees prepare to place a simulated deceased 
patient into a body bag.
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Feedback and Observations
Feedback from course graduates and returning responders 
during and immediately after each course session confirmed 
that the most crucial aspects of the course were hands-on, 
practical exercises, especially donning and doffing PPE. 
We therefore constructed a second mock ETU where stu-
dents were able to don and doff PPE, practice dexterity ex-
ercises in double-gloved hands, and develop and discuss 
other potential ETU layouts while waiting to perform the 
practical exercises in the main ETU. This second mock 
ETU enabled trainees to practice, ask additional questions, 
and further discuss infection control procedures.
To improve trainees’ understanding of the systematic 
process, our teaching model also incorporated trainees as 
instructors during the practical exercises. We asked train-
ees to identify breaches in their partner’s PPE and instruct 
fellow trainees during the doffing process. To better un-
derstand PPE doffing, trainees replaced course instructors 
during the doffing process and gave explicit step-by-step 
instructions to fellow trainees as they removed PPE piece 
by piece. To ensure that proper techniques and procedures 
were followed, course instructors supervised all activities.
We encouraged flexibility in course instructors and 
trainees in various scenarios but still stressed the value of 
recognizing a safe work environment. International sup-
port for control of the 2014 West Africa EVD epidemic 
entailed aid from hundreds of international organizations. 
Healthcare workers who deployed to West Africa therefore 
encountered a wide variety of PPE supplies, ETU layouts, 
and safety protocols. Hence, rather than focusing our train-
ing on mastering a specific protocol, we attempted to instill 
a general culture of safety by providing trainees with the 
knowledge and skills to work safely in ETUs, identify and 
correct safety deficiencies, and feel empowered to with-
draw from unsafe situations.
Course Sustainability
Given the relative rarity of EVD, limited formal training 
courses exist worldwide. Several organizations and institu-
tions, including foreign ministries of health, have expressed 
interest in establishing their own EVD training courses and 
requested our training materials. In response to these re-
quests and to make course content easily accessible and re-
producible, we created a Web-based toolkit that included all 
lectures, facilitator guides for small-group exercises, com-
prehensive trainer guides with video tutorials of practical 
exercises, supply checklists, and administrative templates 
required to implement the course. The toolkit went through 
extensive review and clearance by representatives of CDC, 
MSF, and WHO; on April 2, 2015, the complete toolkit 
was posted on the CDC Ebola website (https://www.cdc.
gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/safety-training-course/training-toolkit.
html). The step-by-step instructions and detailed materials 
in the toolkit might enable other organizations and coun-
tries to reproduce this training, given appropriate resources. 
The kit could help other countries, particularly those with 
a history of EVD outbreaks, better prepare for and respond 
to future outbreaks.
Conclusions
Establishment of the CDC EVD Safety Training Course 
was a relatively low-cost but high-impact activity that 
required an exceptional time commitment and flexibility 
from an evolving multidisciplinary team and dedicated 
trainees. Effective course execution required staff with di-
verse specialties, specialized supplies, transportation and 
housing for trainees, specific facilities for training, rapid 
access to funding, and complex interagency agreements. 
The implementation challenges included rapid hiring, con-
tracting, and management of nearly 200 staff; recruitment 
and selection of course trainees and instructors; and de-
velopment and review of course materials, including PPE 
protocols for ETUs in West Africa, when no international 
consensus existed.
Sudden public health emergencies can demand inten-
sive and specialized training. The CDC EVD Safety Train-
ing Course was an innovative and extensive US training ef-
fort designed specifically to fill the previously unmet need 
to prepare clinicians to deploy to West Africa in response 
to the 2014 EVD epidemic. As was the case for the Haiti 
cholera epidemic of 2010, rapid development of a special-
ized clinical training course was a fundamental component 
 
Table 2. Sponsoring agencies of 570 trainees attending Ebola 
Virus Disease Safety Training Course, Anniston, Alabama, USA, 
2014–2015 
Agency No. (%) 
US government 352 (62) 
 Public Health Service 296 (52) 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 26 (5) 
 Armed Forces 18 (3) 
 Other 12 (2) 
Nongovernmental organizations 164 (29) 
 Partners in Health 38 (7) 
 Samaritan’s Purse 24 (4) 
 International Medical Corps 15 (3) 
 Americares 11 (2) 
 Other 76 (13) 
Academic institutions, foreign governments, 
and other  
54 (9) 
  
 
 
Table 3. Estimated cost per Ebola Virus Disease Safety Training 
Course, Anniston, Alabama, USA, 2014–2015* 
Expense Cost, US$ 
Meals 5,182.92 
Lodging 5,700.00 
Administrative and program costs 4,386.24 
Transportation 5,355.00 
Personal protective equipment 6,468.32 
Total 27,092.48 
*3-day course, 36 trainees. 
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of the public health response to epidemic disease (30). The 
CDC EVD Safety Training Course quickly increased the 
number of clinicians who could provide care in West Af-
rica ETUs, showing the feasibility of rapidly developing 
and implementing focused training in response to a public 
health emergency. Course graduates could use these spe-
cialized skills for future outbreaks of hemorrhagic fevers, 
although setting-specific components of the course ad-
dressing epidemiologic, cultural, and other issues would 
need to be adapted. Moreover, several key components 
of the EVD Safety Training Course (i.e., IPC procedures 
such as proper PPE donning and doffing, personal safety 
measures such as stress management in ETUs) might have 
considerable applicability to outbreaks of other pathogens 
that affect resource-limited settings.
In the following ways, advance preparation could 
greatly help rapidly mobilize a multifaceted training course 
as part of the response to future complex infectious disease 
emergencies. First, having a standing cadre of dedicated 
staff and a plan for developing training courses would in-
crease the efficiency and speed of course development and 
implementation. The plan would include maintaining lists of 
staff specialized in instructional design, infectious diseases, 
public health, healthcare infection control, and logistics, who 
could fill needs depending on the course and contact lists of 
supplemental staff and contractors. Second, having contact 
and ordering information for various local and international 
manufacturers with detailed resource estimates could expe-
dite supply procurement. Third, having established train-
ing sites with active partnership agreements in place would 
bypass the time-consuming and burdensome process of site 
identification and contract negotiation. Fourth, reliable fund-
ing sources and high-level institutional support is critical for 
quickly overcoming barriers.
The 2014 Ebola epidemic provides a reminder that 
the threat of global outbreaks of emerging infectious dis-
eases is real and immediate. It is with these threats in 
mind that CDC and public health partners developed the 
Global Health Security Agenda (https://www.cdc.gov/
globalhealth/security/index.htm), which supports capacity-
building in ≈40 countries to prevent, detect, and respond to 
infectious disease threats. The CDC EVD Safety Training 
Course is a relevant and timely example of how interna-
tional partners can work collaboratively to meet the Global 
Health Security Agenda objectives of more rapidly detect-
ing, responding to, and controlling public health emergen-
cies at their source and thereby enhancing global health 
security. Maintaining institutional memory of this effort, 
by establishing a core team of educators who could serve 
as a dedicated rapid training team, would help preserve 
expertise gained by development of this course, which in 
turn would enable a more nimble response to future urgent 
training needs with regard to new or emerging pathogens.
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